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ABSTRACT
e diusion of low-cost sensor network technologies in smart
buildings has enabled the collection of massive amounts of data re-
garding indoor environments, energy use and occupants, which, in
turn, creates opportunities for knowledge- and information-based
building management. Driven by benets mutual to occupants,
building managers, and research communities, there is a demand
for data publication to foster more sophisticated and robust mod-
els and algorithms. Data in the original form, however, contains
sensitive information about occupants’ behavioral paerns, and
publishing such data will violate individuals’ privacy. e current
practice on publishing building-related datasets relies primarily
on policies for dictating which types of data can be published and
agreements on the use of published data. is approach alone pro-
vides insucient protection as it does not prevent privacy breaches
from occurring in the rst place.
In this paper, we present PAD, which to our knowledge is the rst
system that provides a technological solution for publishing build-
ing related datasets in a privacy-preserving manner while main-
taining high data quality. PAD is able to oer a strong anonymity
guarantee by perturbing data records. e unique feature of PAD is
that it oers an interface to incorporate dataset users into the loop
of data publication and customizes the perturbation such that useful
information in the dataset can be beer retained. We study the
ecacy of PAD using occupancy and plug load data collected in real
buildings. e experiments demonstrate that PAD can achieve high
resilience to privacy threats without introducing any signicant
data delity penalties.
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1 INTRODUCTION
e large-scale sensor networks deployed in smart buildings pro-
duce massive amounts of data, which is being used to inform data-
driven decision making to achieve higher eciency, beer comfort
and more security. Occupancy modeling and energy proling are
two good examples of building applications with a signicant focus
and reliance on data-driven analytics. Occupancy modeling derives
occupancy schedules from data and allows for on-demand control
over lighting and HVAC systems [20]. Similarly, energy proling
involves the characterization of users’ energy use. Such character-
ization can be used to gain insights into how buildings are used,
operated, and managed [16].
Spurred on by benets mutual to occupants, building managers
and research communities, there is a continually rising demand for
the publication of datasets collected in buildings. For research com-
munities, large-scale and high-quality datasets are oen enablers of
more robust and sophisticated models. e convergence of big data
and more advanced data analysis tools developed by researchers
will eventually give rise to more resilient, occupant-responsive, and
cost-eective building management.
However, data published in the original form comes with the
risk of privacy loss, as it allows detailed inference about users’
behaviors. Previous studies [11, 21] have shown that occupants’
schedules and activities can be easily retrieved from occupancy
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and energy datasets. Tech-savvy criminals are already exploiting
unintentional occupancy leaks to select victims for burglaries [4]. In
addition, electricity data also indirectly reveals private information
that is of interest to insurance companies, marketers, potential
employers or the government for seings such as premium rates,
directing ads, veing an applicant’s background or monitoring its
citizens [23].
Current practice in publishing building-related datasets mainly
relies on policy and agreements to regulate data use, sharing, and
retention [2]. However, this prescriptive approach does not pre-
vent privacy breaches from happening in the rst place. Prior to
publication, privacy sensitive datasets are oen anonymized by
suppressing direct identiers such as the identity of record own-
ers. However, datasets resulting from applying simple suppression
operations are vulnerable to adversaries with auxiliary knowledge.
Given that an adversary possesses a few snippets of a user’s data
or prior knowledge of the user’s paern, the data record of such
user can be easily re-identied from the anonymized database by
matching the records with the auxiliary information. is prior
knowledge oen can be easily obtained via external observations
or interaction with the targeted user.
Privacy-preserving data publication has been extensively studied
in various contexts, including social networks [18], smart meter
data [28], etc. Depending on the underlying denition of privacy,
data publication procedures can be generally categorized into three
types: (1) dierentially private, (2) information-theoretically pri-
vate, and (3) k-anonymous. Dierential privacy [10] is one of the
most popular metrics for privacy, which enjoys mathematical rig-
orousness and oen acts as a worst-case privacy measure against
any possible adversaries. It is typically assured by adding appro-
priately chosen random noise to the database output. Dierential
private systems have been successfully deployed to collect data on
Chrome Web browser [12]. One known challenge for dierentially-
private publication is that for high-dimensional streaming data it
oen adds too much noise, which may lead to unsatisfactory data
utility. Hence it is not applicable for releasing building-related
datasets which are typically in the form of time series. Information-
theoretically private publication guarantees that limited knowledge
can be learned about individuals from public database, and the
amount of information leakage is characterized via information the-
ory [9, 19]. Pajagopalan et al. [27] adopts an information-theoretic
approach to studying the publication of smart meter databases. is
framework facilitates the analysis of privacy-utility tradeo for data
publication. However, the use of this framework requires a model
of private behaviors, which is oen dicult to be constructed in
practice.
K-anonymous publication provides a “hide-in-the-crowd” type
of privacy guarantee. It ensures that each record in a database is
indistinguishable from at least k − 1 other records in the database.
Sincek-anonymity is conceptually simple and easily implementable,
it has been extensively used in various public datasets especially for
location data collected from mobile devices [15]. Some states in the
U.S., such as California, Colorado and Illinois, have enacted a pri-
vacy standard, oen referred to as “15/15” rule, for utilities in order
to help ensure customer anonymity when energy data is released
to third parties without customer consent [1]. e privacy standard
is based on k-anonymity concept, requiring that aggregated data
include a minimum of 15 customers with no one customer’s load
exceeding 15 percent of the group’s energy consumption.
In this paper, we present PAD, a privacy-preserving data publi-
cation system that is able to release high-dimensional datasets with
k-anonymity guarantee as well as low information loss. A unique
feature of PAD that dierentiates it from existing k-anonymous
data publication systems is that if the purpose of a dataset is known
prior to publication, PAD can incorporate the dataset users’ inputs
into the publication process and customize the published dataset to
make it beer serve the purpose of the data. PAD oers a unied
protocol to comprehend possibly very diverse interests of data users
and optimizes data publication in accordance with data purpose.
e contributions of the paper are as follows.
• Design and implement an open-sourced system to publish
building-related datasets that guarantee k-anonymity.
• Employing metric learning techniques to learn the intended
data use from interactions with the data analyst and then
use it to reduce the information loss incurred by data pri-
vatization.
• Extensive experimental evaluation using real-world build-
ing data on occupancy presence and plug-load energy
consumption to demonstrate the value of k-anonymized
datasets.
e paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce
the concept of k-anonymity, its privacy implications and the ba-
sic technique for achieving k-anonymity. Section 3 presents the
architecture of PAD and the individual algorithms used in the im-
plementation of PAD. In Section 4, we present the evaluation of
PAD based on real-world datasets. Section 5 discusses the limitation
of PAD and future work. Section 6 includes the related work of our
paper. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 K-ANONYMITY
e concept of k-anonymity [29] was originally introduced in the
context of relational data privacy. e idea behind k-anonymity
can be described as “hiding in the crowd”, as it requires that each
individual cannot be identied within a set of k individuals in the
released data.
In this paper, we deal with a slightly more general denition of
k-anonymity, i.e., we consider a row in database as k-anonymous
if and only if it is indistinguishable from at least k − 1 other rows.
Depending on the contents of a row, this denition can incorporate
the privacy guarantee at dierent levels. For instance, if each row is
a daily energy or occupancy prole of a person, then this denition
ensures that the prole of each day cannot be dierentiated from
k − 1 other proles. If we consider that each row in the database
contains information of an individual person, then we recover user-
level privacy which guarantees the indistinguishability of k persons
and therefore oers a stronger privacy notion.
In this section, we will discuss the privacy value of k-anonymity
and aacker models, followed by a brief introduction of basic tech-
niques for achieving k-anonymity. We will close the section by
discussing the intrinsic tradeo between privacy and data utility
and some limitation of basic techniques to motivate the design of
the proposed system.
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2.1 Privacy Value
We illustrate the privacy value of the k-anonymity model by com-
paring it with the strategy that only masks the identier of each
row in a database. Assuming a data analyst requests data publishing
and the database is sanitized solely by suppressing names of the
data owners, we want to show that the information retained in this
database can still create a threat against data privacy, especially
when combined with external observations or knowledge.
As an example, consider the scenario depicted in Figure 1 where
the database contains four rows corresponding to the oce oc-
cupancy status of four persons labeled as A, B, C, and D. If no
k-anonymization is performed by the data curator, then the follow-
ing linkage aack can be performed: Suppose the adversary knows
that C stays in this oce at 20:00, then by linking this information
with the data trajectories it has at hand it can nd the complete
occupancy status of C in the time horizon of the published data.
However, such linkage aack is not eective if proper data pertur-
bation is performed by the data curator to maintain k-anonymity.
Consider the 2-anonymized version of the original dataset illus-
trated by Figure 1b. Now, even if the adversary can have access to
the knowledge of occupancy status of C via external observations,
it cannot recover the complete data trajectories with certainty as
2-anonymity guarantees that at least 2 rows in the database have
exactly the same values.
24:00
A
B
C
D
12:00 16:00 20:000:00 4:00 8:00
(a) Original data
A
B
C
D
12:00 16:00 20:00 24:000:00 4:00 8:00
(b) 2-anonymous data
Figure 1: Linkage attack.
In this paper, we wish to achieve data protection against the
adversaries with the following capabilities: (1) Having access to the
published data; (2) Knowing short snippets of truthful private data
by external observations.
2.2 Microaggregation
Microaggregation is a popular perturbation technique to achieve
k-anonymity for databases with quantitative records. It processes
the data in the following two steps prior to publication:
Step 1 (k-partition): All rows in the database are partitioned
into small aggregates of k or more rows.
Step 2 (substitution): Each individual row is replaced with the
centroid of the group it belongs to.
Following this procedure ensures that every record in the re-
leased database corresponds to at least k individual records; hence,
k-anonymity is guaranteed.
Due to the data distortion introduced in the substitution step, the
main problem in microaggregation is to retain as much information
as possible while oering sucient privacy protection. In order to
minimize the information loss caused by microaggregation, groups
should be formed by maximizing their within-group homogeneity.
e more homogeneous the records in a group are, the lower infor-
mation loss is incurred when replacing the true value of a record
by the group average. e sum of squared distances (SSD) criterion
is a common measure to estimate group heterogeneity and this is
dened as
SSD =
д∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
d(xi j , x¯i ) (1)
where xi j denotes the j-th row of i-th group, x¯i represents the
centroid of the group i , ni is the number of elements in i-th group
and д stands for the number of groups.
e distance metric d(·, ·) in equation (1) is oen chosen to be
an uninformed norm, such as Euclidean distance. Although Eu-
clidean distance is simple and intuitive, it ignores the fact that the
semantic meaning of “information loss” is inherently task- and data-
dependent [30]. To illustrate this point, imagine two researchers
who want to analyze the same occupancy dataset. e rst one
is interested in the occupancy paerns during electricity peak de-
mand hours in order to estimate the demand response potential,
whereas the second one is interested in the aggregate occupancy
over the day for energy modeling purposes. Given the nature of
their respective tasks, both should use very dierent distance met-
rics to measure the information loss. If the purpose of the data
is known at the time of publication, it can be taken into account
during microaggregation to beer retain information. But clearly,
building a system to parse data users’ interest is not the most robust
and scalable approach due to the diversity of dierent data analysts’
interest. It is, therefore, more desirable to have a standard protocol
for dierent users to express their respective data purposes. Our
approach implemented in PAD is to learn the distance metric ex-
plicitly for each specic application from data points’ similarity
labeled by the user.
3 PAD: DESIGN AND ALGORITHMS
In this section, we rst give an overview of PAD and then provide
an in-depth description of the algorithms implemented in each
module of the system. We assume that the data publisher collects
data records and releases the collected data to the data recipient,
who will then conduct data mining on the published data. We
will use “data recipient” and “data analyst” interchangeably in this
paper. Further, we assume that the data publisher is trustworthy
yet the data recipients are not. is assumption is also referred to
as the trusted model [13]. Since in our framework data analysts can
interact with the data publication system to improve the usefulness
of the published data, it is important to ensure that data analysts
do not have access to the original database during any part of the
data publication process.
3.1 System Overview
Figure 2 illustrates the design of PAD. e objective of the system
is to publish the dataset with k-anonymity guarantee as well as
high quality in support of the required data analysis. e core idea
of the system is to improve the data delity by learning how the
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Database
2.	Subsampling
Data pairs
Published database
4.	Microaggregation
Data Publisher
Similarity label3.	Metric	Learning
Data Analyst
1.	Pre-sanitization
Figure 2: PAD diagram: If the purpose of the dataset to
be published is not known prior to publication, then PAD
directly applies microaggregation with an uninformed dis-
tance metric to sanitize the dataset (shown in red dashed ar-
row). Otherwise, PAD processes the data in the following
steps: (1) e data is rstly pre-sanitized and formed into
pairs; (2) e data pairs are subsampled and returned to the
data analyst to solicit their labels on which data pairs are
considered to be similar (e labels can be assigned man-
ually or automatically using custom programs); (3) PAD
learns a metric from the similarity labels; (4) e learned
metric is used bymicroaggregation to generate the sanitized
dataset for nal publication.
data is intended to be used and then proactively adjusting the data
perturbation algorithm accordingly.
If the data is not used for specialized purposes, then PAD directly
applies microaggregation and publishes the database. Otherwise,
the PAD system processes the original database in the following
four steps.
(1) Pre-sanitization. e objective of this step is to provide a
k-anonymized dataset for the data analyst to label the similarity of
data points. e similarity labels will be used to learn the purpose
of the data analysis in subsequent steps. At this step the system has
not received any inputs from the data analyst yet. We will therefore
use microaggregation with a simple generic distance metric, e.g.,
Euclidean distance, to pre-sanitize the data.
(2) Subsampling. As the second step, PAD processes the rows
in the pre-sanitized database into pairs and randomly selects some
pairs to be returned to the data analyst, who will then assign a
binary label indicating if the two rows are similar or not in accor-
dance with the particular data purpose to each returned data pair.
Consider, for example, the two pairs of occupancy records depicted
in Figure 3. If the data analyst wants the published dataset to max-
imally retain the information regarding the occupancy paerns
during lunch time, then he will assign “dissimilar” to the rst pair
and “similar” to the second one; however, if the data analyst is inter-
ested in the occupancy paerns during the entire day, then the rst
pair will be labeled as “similar” and the second one as “dissimilar”.
In the case where the desired metric for comparing similarity can
be explicitly dened, labeling eort can be greatly alleviated by
using computer programs to automatically label similarity of data
points based on the desired metric.
(3) Metric learning. In this step, a distance metric over the
data record is automatically learned from the data pairs and the
similarity relationships indicated by the data analyst.
24:00
1st pair 2nd pair
12:00 16:00 20:000:00 4:00 8:00 24:0012:00 16:00 20:000:00 4:00 8:00
Lunch time
Figure 3: Illustration of determining similarity labels.
(4)Microaggregation. is step uses the distance metric learned
from the previous step for microaggregation so that the database
can be sanitized in a way that the information of interest to the
data analyst is maximally retained.
We want to point out that the existence, amount and quality of
similarity labels provided by the data analyst aect the usefulness
of the published data; however, the privacy level remains the same
regardless because the dataset is always microaggregated before
publication.
3.2 Distance Metric Learning
We will rst discuss the algorithm implemented in the distance
metric learning step. Let the original, pre-sanitized, and nally
published dataset be denoted by X , Xˆ , and X˜ , respectively. In the
metric learning step, the data analyst is provided with some data
pairs (xˆk , xˆ j ) (k, j = 1, · · · , |Xˆ |) from the pre-sanitized database, and
assigns a similarity label to each of the data pairs. Our objective
is to learn a distance metric d(x ,y) between points x and y so that
“similar” points end up close to each other.
e idea underlying our metric learning is to parameterize the
distance metric and nd the parameters that best explain the simi-
larity relationships labeled by the data analyst. To be specic, we
consider the distance function of the following form
d(x ,y) = dA(x ,y) =
√
(x − y)TA(x − y) (2)
where A is a semi-denite matrix to ensure d(x ,y) to be a well-
dened metric that satises non-negativity and the triangle in-
equality. is distance metric, also termed Mahalanobis distance, is
a generalization of Euclidean distance by admiing linear scalings
and rotations of the original data space. A is oen termed as inverse
covariance (IC) matrix. Seing A to be the identity matrix I gives
the Euclidean distance; Restricting A to be diagonal corresponds
to learning a metric where the dierent axes are weighted dier-
ently. Note that dA(x ,y) =
√
(x − y)TA(x − y) = ‖A 12 x − A 12y‖2,
and therefore learning a full matrix A is equivalent to nding a
scaling and rotation of data that replaces each point x with A
1
2 x
and applying the Euclidean distance to the tranformed data.
Suppose each row record has lengthm, i.e., x ∈ Rm , and the num-
ber of parameters to be estimated in total ism2. Building-related
datasets are oen in the form of time series, som is large. However,
we would like to require as minimal a labeling eort as possible to
facilitate the use of PAD. Consequently, the main technical chal-
lenge is to learn a distance metric in the “high-dimensional” regime
where the number of parameters to be determined is larger than
the number of labeled samples.
Various distance metric learning techniques [30, 31] have been
proposed in the literature, the core idea behind which is to form an
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optimization objective that minimizes the distance between the data
pairs labeled as “similar” and pushes the “dissimilar” pairs far away.
As for metric learning in the high-dimensional regime, a typical
technique used is to pose some restrictions or prior knowledge
information on the distance metric model to regularize the model
complexity. Consequently, only a smaller number of examples are
required to learn a well posed metric [5, 26].
Our approach adopts a similar idea and restricts the complexity
of distance metric by imposing l1 penalty. We propose the following
l1-regularized optimization to nd the Mahalanobis distance from
the data pairs with similarity labels:
minimize
A
∑
(xˆk , xˆ j )∈S
d2A(xˆk , xˆ j ) + λ‖A‖1 (3)
subject to
∑
(xˆk , xˆ j )∈D
dA(xˆk , xˆ j ) ≥ c (4)
A  0 (5)
whereS andD are the sets of data pairs that are labeled as “similar”
and “dissimilar” respectively. e above optimization demands
similar points to have small squared distances between them while
dissimilar points be separated by a margin c . e choice of the
constant c is arbitrary but not important, and changing it to any
other positive constantb results only inA being replaced by (b/c)2A.
Herein, we set c = 1 for simplicity. e high-dimensional nature of
the distance metric over time series data and the relative scarcity of
the labeled samples results in that the optimization problem without
l1 regularization is oen underdetermined. e l1 norm penalty
ensures the solution to be sparse and capable of being generalized
to unseen data pairs.
3.3 Ecient Algorithm for Microaggregation
As discussed previously, microaggregation includes two steps, namely,
k-partition that clusters the data into group sizes of at leastk records
and a substitution step that perturbs the data by replacing the true
values by the group centroid. It is possible that the data type of
group centroid values are not consistent with the original data. For
instance, the centroid of multiple occupancy time series is not neces-
sary to be in an integer form. In such cases, proper post-processing,
like rounding, should be conducted to make the published database
meaningful.
e information loss in the published dataset is mainly deter-
mined by the k-partition step. An optimal k-partition is dened
to be the one that minimizes the heterogeneity of group members
characterized by equation (1). Note that k-partition is dierent from
the classical clustering problem where the goal is to split the dataset
into a xed number of groups irrespective of the group size. In
the case of k-partition, the constraints is on the group size instead
of the number of groups. Nevertheless, we can modify the classi-
cal agglomerative clustering to make it serve for the k-partition
purposes by terminating the agglomeration process at the proper
level where the size of each group formed satises the constraints
desired by the optimal k-partition.
e following proposition states the properties of the sizes of
groups formed by optimal k-partition.
Proposition 1. An optimal solution to the k-partition problem
of a set of data exists such that its groups have size greater than or
equal to k and less than 2k .
e proof can be found in [7]. Proposition 1 indicates that the
search space of the optimal k-partition can be reduced to the par-
tition where all groups have size between k and 2k . We therefore
modify a widely used agglomerative clustering algorithm, Ward’s
method [8], to provide a heuristic and ecient solution that fullls
the group size requirements. e detailed algorithm is presented in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 k-ward algorithm
Input: Database Xi , i = 1, · · · ,n
1: Group initialization
2: Dene the extreme data points as the two which are most
distant
3: For each of the extreme data points, take k − 1 data closest to
it and form the rst two groups
4: e rest of data points in the dataset constitute single-element
groups
5: Agglomerative clustering via Ward’s method
6: while there exists some group of the size less than k do
7: Find the nearest pair of distinct groups, at least one of which
must have size less than k
8: Merge the two groups and decrement the number of groups
by one
9: end while
10: if there exists some group containing 2k or more data then
11: Apply k-ward algorithm recursively on those groups
12: end if
4 EVALUATION
We evaluate the performance of PAD using two datasets collected
in real-world buildings. e questions we would like to answer
from the experiments are: (1) How useful are the sanitized datasets
for typical data mining purposes? (2) If the use purpose of a dataset
is predetermined, can a dataset sanitized with the learned metric
retain more relevant information than the one sanitized with an
uninformed metric?
4.1 Datasets and Implementation
Our datasets include occupancy and plug-load power consumption,
which represent typical building data types that may arouse oc-
cupants’ privacy concerns. e occupancy dataset, lasting about
half a year, was collected at a resolution of 1 minute in four class-
rooms of the OU44 building at the University of Southern Denmark.
e occupancy time series is binary, indicating if the room is oc-
cupied/unoccupied. is dataset can potentially reveal privacy
sensitive information such as daily routines and detailed schedules
of the inhabitants. e plug load dataset consists of 15-minute-
resolution power consumption data over 3 months. is dataset
was collected at the individual desks of ve occupants located in
Cory Hall on UC Berkeley campus. Plug-load data also raises some
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privacy concerns. As shown in the previous studies [22, 24], oc-
cupants’ presence or even more detailed activities can be easily
identied from the power data.
Since our dataset contains a relatively small population of indi-
viduals, we will consider anonymity protection at the daily prole
level instead of the user level. In this regard, we process the dataset
into the form where each row corresponds to a person’s daily oc-
cupancy or energy prole. We would like to stress that PAD can
also protect the anonymity at user level by feeding a dataset where
each row corresponds to the data of a dierent user. e code of
PAD is open-sourced at hps://github.com/ruoxijia.
4.2 Utility of PAD with Generic Distance Metric
We rst focus on a general scenario where the system does have
access to similarity labels. erefore, a generic metric, i.e., Eu-
clidean distance, is used to perform micro-aggregation operation
on the datasets to achieve k-anonymity. We utilize two typical data
mining tasks, namely, occupancy prediction and statistical paern
detection, to test the usefulness of the dataset aer sanitization.
4.2.1 Prediction. K-nearest neighbor (KNN) based occupancy
prediction models are built using the original and sanitized database
respectively with varying anonymity levels. To make prediction
at time t , we compute the distance between the testing prole and
all proles in the training set during the interval [t − ∆t , t − 1]
where ∆t is the length of the window used for prediction, and then
pick the most common occupancy value at t among the K nearest
training proles. Cross validation is performed to compute the
average prediction accuracy across all time steps in the day. e
results are shown in Figure 4a, where the prediction accuracies
with original and sanitized dataset are both above 90%. ere is a
tradeo between anonymity protection level and data utility. We
can see that the prediction accuracy drops as the anonymity level
of the published dataset is increased.
It is important to note that moderate degree of anonymization
is helpful for improving model’s robustness and beer ing un-
seen data. Particularly, KNN model constructed with 2-anonymized
dataset achieves higher prediction accuracy than that built with
original dataset. We also implement an occupancy prediction model
based on Support Vector Machine (SVM) and the corresponding
results are shown in Figure 4b where we can observe the similar
paerns. is is because the training data points usually contain
both the useful information that can be used to predict unseen cases,
as well as the useless noise that can degrade the model. Essentially,
k-anonymization reduces the “harmful” noise by aggregating simi-
lar data points and avoids overing. is suggests that for a data
publication with moderate anonymity requirement the sanitized
dataset is more advantageous than the original dataset since the
sanitized one can achieve privacy protection as well as an improved
model quality.
4.2.2 Statistics. Oen, the raw time series collected in buildings
are processed into some key information that is directly useful for
informing various control applications. For instance, the occupancy
statistics, such as arrival times, are of particular interest to design-
ing occupant-responsive HVAC control algorithms. In light of this,
we want to test if the sanitized database can retain these useful
(a) (b)
Figure 4: Comparison of prediction performance of occu-
pancymodels constructed by using the original vs. sanitized
database.
(a) Original vs. 2-anonymized (b) Original vs. 7-anonymized
(c) Original vs. 2-anonymized (d) Original vs. 7-anonymized
(e) Original vs. 2-anonymized (f) Original vs. 7-anonymized
Figure 5: Comparison of occupancy statistics extracted from
the original and sanitized database.
statistics. Figure 5 compares the histograms of the useful occu-
pancy statistics including arrival time, departure time, and total
occupation time extracted from the original and sanitized database,
respectively. We can see that 2-anonymized database preserves
the distribution of the interested statistics, especially the modes
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of the distribution. In other words, we can still retrieve accurate
information about typical behaviors of occupants from the sanitized
database. However, it is worth noting that data sanitization reduces
the variability of the dataset, which is geing more pronounced
when the anonymity level is increased to 7 as shown in Figure 5b,
5d and 5f. For instance, the departures at noon cannot be detected
with the anonymized dataset. is is a direct consequence of “hide
in the crowd” philosophy of k-anonymity. erefore, it will be
easier to mine population properties than atypical paerns from
the sanitized data.
4.3 Utility of PADWith Customized Distance
Metric
In this part, we investigate scenarios where the purpose of the
data is known at the time of publication and there exists a “best”
distance metric for microaggregation that retains maximal amount
of information pertaining to the data analyst’s interest. For instance,
if the data is used for studying occupancy paerns of a building
during lunch times, then the best metric will be the Euclidean
distance over the lunch time period. e data sequences with similar
lunch paerns will be grouped together by the “best” metric, and
the information loss on lunch paerns caused by the substitution
step will thereby be minimized. Similar to the previous evaluation
section, we utilize two evaluation scenarios, namely, segments and
peak hour energy usage, to exemplify potential interest of data
analysts.
Note that although there has been fruitful previous research
on data publishing, dierent approaches may not be directly com-
parable because they may have dierent viewpoints on what is
considered to be “private”. is is because existing work on k-
anonymization of datasets always relies on a generic metric in
the microaggregation step. erefore, PAD with generic distance
metric is used as the baseline approach for comparison here.
4.3.1 Segment. We use the following example to demonstrate
the role of distance metric learning in the workow of PAD. Con-
sider that the data analyst wants to study the occupancy paerns
during lunch time, i.e., 11 : 00 − 14 : 00. e IC matrix A associated
with the best metric that minimizes the information loss during
lunch period is illustrated in Figure 6a, which is equivalent to cut-
ting o the lunch period and applying the Euclidean distance. We
call this best metric as ground truth metric. e distance metric
learned by PAD is shown in Figure 6b, which visually exhibits the
same paern as the ground truth metric. e values on the diagonal
pertaining to the lunch period dominate.
Close scrutinization on the learned metric shows that it contains
some small nonzero o-diagonal entries which intuitively corre-
spond to the rotation and rescaling of the original occupancy times
series. In order to understand the eect of these small nonzero
entries, we cluster all the daily proles in the database according to
the lunch time paerns and apply the linear transformation implied
by the learned metric to the occupancy series in each cluster. e
results are shown in Figure 7a and 7b, respectively. We can see that
the distance learning procedure nds a linear transformation under
which the data points that are “similar” in the data analyst’s view
are close to each other in terms of Euclidean distance.
(a) (b)
Figure 6: Comparison of ground truth metric and the
learned metric for specialized data publication for lunch
times.
(a)
(b)
Figure 7: (a) Clustering of occupancy time series according
to lunch patterns; (b) Applying the linear transformation
implied by the learnedmetric to the data in each cluster. e
number before “ELT” in the parenthesis gives the number of
elements in each cluster.
Figure 8 compares sanitization procedures that use a generic
metric, the learned metric, and the ground truth metric, respectively,
in terms of the tradeo between anonymity level and information
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loss. We want to emphasize that the information loss for special-
purpose publication measures the dierence between the interested
information in the original data record and that in the sanitized
record. Here, the information loss refers to the Euclidean distance
of the lunch periods between the record in the original database
and its sanitized version in the published database. We can see
that the information loss can be signicantly reduced by learning a
proper metric for microaggregation.
Figure 8: e tradeo between anonymity level and infor-
mation loss for the specialized publication for lunch time.
Figure 9 demonstrates that with more labeled data pairs PAD
can achieve beer data quality. e pre-sanitized database contains
16 dierent entries, and the maximum number of data pairs for
labeling is
(16
2
)
= 120. Although it requires extra labeling eort to
reduce information loss, we want to point out that the data analyst
can use computer program to achieve automatic labeling in the case
where the desired metric is explicitly dened. For example, in this
experiment we write a script to label the similarity of data points
by rst clustering the data points and assigning the similarity label
to a data pair according to whether the pair of points reside in the
same cluster. We can also observe from Figure 9 that more labeled
data pairs can reduce the variance of published data quality as well.
Figure 9: e tradeo between labeling eort and informa-
tion loss.
4.3.2 Peak hour energy usage. We consider an energy data use
case that mines occupants’ peak-hour energy use paerns. More
specically, the data analyst is interested in acquiring accurate
information on total energy consumption during the peak hours,
i.e., 17 : 00 − 20 : 00. e ground truth metric associated with
this example can be dened as dp (x ,x ′) = ‖ f (x) − f (x ′)‖2 where
f calculates the sum of the coordinates during peak hours for x
and x ′. Figure 10 shows the information loss of peak time usage
in the published datasets using the generic metric, the learned
metric and the ground truth metric, respectively, under dierent
anonymity guarantees. Again, the information loss is measured
by the dierence between peak-hour total usage of the original
record and that of the sanitized version in the published database.
We can observe a similar tradeo between privacy and data quality
to what we have seen in the use case of lunch-time segment. e
information loss can be reduced by replacing a generic metric with
the learned metric.
Figure 10: e tradeo between anonymity and information
loss for data publication specialized for peak hour energy
usage.
Figure 11 shows the distribution of peak-time energy usage in
the original database and the databases sanitized via the generic
and learned metric. We can see that the learned metric beer
retains the modes of the original distribution. For instance, the
peak-hour energy usage below 5000 W is completely neglected by
the sanitized database with generic metric while the learned metric
successfully grasps this probability mass and beer captures the
variation embedded in the original dataset.
(a) (b)
Figure 11: Comparison of 5-anonymized datasets with the
Euclidean distance metric and the learned metric on peak-
hour energy usage information recovery.
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4.4 Computational Overhead
We also study the computational overhead associated with PAD.
We rst look into the complexity of the microaggregation part. Let
the size of database be n, the dimension of the row bem, and the
anonymity level be k . e microaggregation complexity mainly
comprises O(n2m) computations of distance values and the com-
plexity of the clustering process which is shown to be n(1 − 1/k)
in the best case and (n/k − 1)(n/2 + k − 2) in the worst case [6].
Figure 12 demonstrates the computation time of microaggregation
as a function of n,m and k . We can see that the overhead is approx-
imately quadratic in the database size and linear in the dimension
of the row. In addition, changing the anonymity level requirement
does not aect the computational time signicantly.
(a) (b)
Figure 12: Computational complexity of microaggregation.
e complexity of the metric learning step depends on the actual
algorithm used for optimization and the convergence criterion.
Figure 13 illustrates the relationship between computational time
of metric learning and database dimension. e spliing conic
solver [25] is used for solving the learned distance metric. e
number of labeled pairs dictates the amount of constraints in the
metric optimization problem. Generally, the computational time
associated with the metric learning part increases with the number
of labeled data pairs and the dimension of the data records.
Figure 13: Computational overhead of metric learning mod-
ule.
5 FUTUREWORK
We have shown that using a sanitized database can oen achieve
similar performance to using original database, and selecting the
proper metric will enhance the published data quality. However,
the distance metric learning step currently implemented in PAD
essentially nds a linear transformation on the original data. is
poses some challenges in retaining information that is a nonlinear
function of the original data series, such as arrival and departure
times. One potential solution is to utilize neural networks [17] to
learn beer metrics in the case where the interested information
is a nonlinear function of the original data record. However, this
approach raises the challenge of the demand for a great number of
labeled data pairs.
Current implementation of PAD implies the published dataset
is optimized for a particular data purpose. If the data analyst has
multiple purposes, it remains a question if there is a distance met-
ric that beer serves for multiple specic purposes than a simple
generic metric. In addition, assuming several data analysts obtain
databases sanitized according to their dierent purposes, it needs
further study on the privacy implication when they collude with
each other.
6 RELATEDWORKS
In this section, we provide more details on the state-of-art of the
private-preserving data publication systems which we have alluded
to in the introduction.
RAPPOR [12] is a data collection and publication system that
provides dierential privacy guarantees. e basic idea of RAPPOR
is the extension of the randomized response technique where the
true data is randomly perturbed to a random value with some prob-
ability depending on the strength of privacy protection. RAPPOR
is only applicable to one or two dimensional crowdsourced data for
estimating data distribution. Plausible deniability [3] is a privacy
notion that has recently been used for generating synthetic dataset
for publication. It ensures at least k input records that could have
generated the observed output with similar probability. Plausible
deniability is closely related to dierential privacy. e authors
in [3] show that a dierentially private mechanism can be obtained
by slightly modifying a plausibly deniable mechanism. e dif-
ference between k-anonymity and plausible deniability is that the
former is a syntactic condition on the published dataset, whereas
the laer is a condition on the synthetic data generation algorithm.
Calmon et al. [9] pioneers research on applying information
theory and statistical decision frameworks to study the privacy
leakage from data publication. e framework models privacy using
a probabilistic argument and data utility to be the distance between
the true value and the perturbed value. Under this framework, the
problem of solving the optimal perturbation can be converted to
the rate-distortion problem which has been extensively studied in
information theory. Rajagopalan el al. [27] applies the framework
to smart meter data publication. e caveat of this framework is
that it requires a model of joint distribution of private information
and sensor measurements, which is however dicult to be obtained
in practice.
K-anonymity has received a great deal of aention during the
last decade, and has been successfully implemented in various
areas among which the most prominent one is location-based ser-
vices [14]. Gruteser et al. [15] presents a location data collection
system that adjusts the resolution of location information along
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spatial or temporal dimensions to meet anonymity constraints. Lo-
cation data takes the form of time series and oen has strong time
correlation, and exhibits similar features to the data collected in
buildings. Our work is partially inspired by the wide adoption of
k-anonymity in location-based services.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present an open-sourced data publication system,
PAD, for protecting k-anonymity of time series data collected in
buildings. PAD guarantees the published data is free from link-
age aack, i.e., the adversary cannot recover the entire time series
record of an individual even if the aacker has the knowledge about
snippets of the individual’s data via external observations. is
is the anonymity guarantee that cannot be achieved by simply re-
moving the identier of the data records, which is nevertheless the
common practice today in building-related data publication. We
show through extensive experiments on a real-world dataset that
the k-anonymized data output by PAD still retains useful informa-
tion for various data mining tasks. In order to further improve the
quality of the data published, PAD implements a metric learning
module that serves as a unied platform on which data analysts
convey their diverse interests via a standardized protocol, i.e., the
system provides a batch of data pairs and the analyst labels simi-
larity accordingly. e learned metric can then be used to beer
preserve the information of interest to data analysts. We demon-
strate that incorporating humans in the loop of data publication
can achieve lower information loss on various building-related data
mining examples. By proposing PAD we hope to revolutionize the
way building related datasets are published.
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